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Catastrophic failure of outbreak containment: Limited testing causes
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Standard measures such as quarantining suspects and contact tracing could not contain
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike for other recent epidemics where such instruments
were successful, in the present case a large fraction of the infected have only mild unspecific
symptoms. By employing network models we here show that even for near perfect contact
tracing and unlimited suspect testing, containment starts to fail when more than approx-
imately half of the carriers fall into the weak-symptom category. The situation becomes
considerably more severe if the number of daily available tests is limited. In this case the
epidemic transition becomes discontinuous and a much larger percentage of the population
becomes infected. While moderate levels of social distancing can bring the situation back
under control, the limited number of daily tests introduces a finite time horizon: If social
distancing is implemented after the cut off date, containment catastrophically breaks down
resulting in an exponential disease spread.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suspect testing combined with quarantining and contact tracing have been key in slowing the
spread of COVID-19. However, unlike for the 2002–2004 SARS outbreak and the 2013–2016 West-
ern African Ebola virus epidemic, this containment strategy did not suffice to stop the present
pandemic. A key difference to these earlier cases is that approximately 80% of the COVID-19
infections appear to be mild, and some studies even suggest that approximately 50% of the total
cases are symptom free [1–4]. Various studies have reported evidence of transmission by weak-
symptom carriers [2, 5] and patient tests conducted with symptomatic and asymptomatic patients
indicated comparable viral loads in both categories [6]. It is evident that transmission by carriers
that are either asymptomatic or only have weak unspecific symptoms, poses a severe obstacle to
containment. However, even carriers without symptoms can be detected if traced as a contact of
a symptomatic person. Hence the ratio of symptomatic to weak-symptom carriers as well as the
efficiency of contact identification are key factors that decide if eventually a disease will spread
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2exponentially or can be contained.
Using network models in the following, we address the question whether suspect testing and high
efficiency contact tracing can contain epidemics with varying ratios of weak-symptom carriers. As
will be shown for epidemics with spreading rates comparable to that of COVID-19, if more than half
of the carriers have weak symptoms the disease cannot be contained by these standard procedures
alone. If aided by social distancing (SD) containment can be achieved but crucially SD must be
implemented early on. If SD is introduced even marginally too late, testing is overwhelmed and
containment breaks down.
II. MODEL
We consider an extension of a spatial SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered) model
[7], where each tile on a 2D grid represents an individual which can fall into one of the above four
compartments. In addition, infectious are split into two categories, symptomatic (IS) and weak-
symptom cases (IW ), where the latter ranges from people who may have unspecific symptoms (e.g.
coughing) to entirely asymptomatic. As a result of intervention measures, the individuals in states
S, E and I can be put under quarantine, formally increasing the number of possible states to
eight, and all possible transition paths are shown in Fig. 1 (a) (see caption for details). The key
features of the model (see also [7]) can be understood from the example given in Fig. 1 (b). An
infectious individual with weak symptoms (brown tile bottom right of Fig. 1 (b)) can at each time
step transmit the disease with a given probability to each of the four nearest neighbours, plus to a
randomly chosen distant individual (mimicking encounters during shopping, travel etc.) with the
same probability, if the target is susceptible. Moreover, we assume that weak-symptom individuals
do not raise suspicion and continue to spread the disease. This is in particular likely when other
infections (e.g. flu or common cold) coincide with the epidemic. A strongly symptomatic case (red
tile in Fig. 1 (b)) on the other hand is identified and quarantined (blue dashed box) immediately.
After testing positive, its four nearest neighbours are quarantined and queued for testing. For every
new positive case, the quarantining and testing procedure is continued. In this idealized setting,
testing therefore eradicates local clusters with perfect efficiency. However, random encounters
with distant individuals are generally much harder to track and, for simplicity, we assume that
they remain undetected. As we will show below, this choice of probabilities is particularly suited
to understand key features of the epidemic transition in the presence of containment measures.
However, none of the findings presented are specific to the parameter choice (e.g. distant encounters
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FIG. 1. (a) Transitions between possible states. Solid arrows denote the typical disease progression for an
undetected individual, while dotted arrows denote possible events in a quarantining and testing scenario. In
particular, S, E, IW and IS are quarantined if they are in contact with a known positive (arrow C), while
IS can be immediately identified and quarantined (arrow S). After testing negative QS reverts to S (arrow
N) while QE , QI and R test positive and transform into R. (b) Spatial implementation. Every day an
infectious individual interacts with their neighbours and a randomly selected individual, and transmits the
disease with a constant probability if the individuals they interact with are susceptible. Upon identification
of a positive case (in figure IS) all the neighbours are put into quarantine and tested. Weak-symptom cases
can only be identified if they are neighbours of a known positive case.
can be made traceable etc.). Further robustness tests conducted include simulations with three
variants of the basic network model. In the first, we alter the nature of distant encounters to realize
a small world network (Kleinberg network, see [8] for details). In the second we introduce high
connectivity hubs up to 100 connections. For the third implementation the lattice is removed and
the network is scale-free up to a maximum of 100 connections (see [9] for details).
Simulations start from a small group of weak-symptom cases that are randomly scattered across
the grid and evolve in a domain representing a population of P = 3000 × 3000. We model the
incubation and infectious period with a Gamma distribution with unitary scale parameter and
mean of 3 and 4 days, respectively (the epidemiological parameters are similar to the ones reported
for COVID-19, cf. [10]). The transmission probability is set to 0.38 to reproduce the average
growth rate ∼ e0.3[ days−1]t observed during the early exponential phase of the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic.
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FIG. 2. Containment breakdown driven by weak-symptom carriers. (a) and (b) Final infected fraction of the
population (NF /P ) as a function of the ratio of weak-symptom cases (pW ) for unlimited and limited available
daily tests, NT = P and NT = 10
−3P , respectively. When weak-symptom cases appear with less than
approximately 40% frequency, outbreaks can be contained efficiently by testing and quarantining. For larger
fractions of weak-symptom cases, the disease can not be contained and a large fraction of the population is
infected. Limited availability in tests further aggravates the scenario and results in an abrupt transition. (c)
Admissible epidemiological parameters that allow successful outbreak containment. Each point of the plot
measures the final fraction of infected Nf/P (cf. colorbar) under unlimited testing conditions (NT = P ).
R0 is the basic reproduction number and is computed following [7]. The white line separates epidemics that
can be successfully contained and shows that containing outbreaks with a high percentage of weak-symptom
infectious cases necessarily requires to lower the basic reproduction number. The approximate parameters
of recent epidemics are indicated by dashed circles.
III. RESULTS
For the first simulation we choose to vary the ratio of weak-symptom carriers (see Fig. 2 (a)).
Each data point can be thought of as a different disease where all the other parameters are held
constant. Plotted is the ratio of the final infected to the total population P . In this simulation we
5assume that there are always sufficient tests available for all suspects with strong symptoms and for
contact tracing. We assume, however, that there are no surplus test capacities, e.g. random checks
on high risk groups etc. While such additional testing can greatly enhance containment, during
the early phase of the COVID-19 outbreak countries were fully occupied with suspect testing and
even strong symptomatic cases had to be put on waiting lists.
As shown in Fig. 2 (a) testing and contact tracing can readily contain the disease when approxi-
mately 60% or more of the infected have recognizable symptoms. In contrast, when weak-symptom
carriers are above a threshold of approximately 40% an epidemic transition (i.e. a second order
phase transition) occurs. Above this threshold a non-vanishing fraction (in the thermodynamic
limit) of the population catches the disease. Therefore, even if contact tracing and hence local
cluster elimination works to perfection, the disease cannot be contained if the fraction of carriers
is above critical. Fig. 2 (b) shows how the critical threshold of weak-symptom carriers scales with
the basic reproduction number (R0) of the uncontrolled disease. Estimates for the respective pa-
rameters for SARS [11, 12] and Ebola [13–15] show that both of these fall into the category that
can be contained by a standard response, while COVID-19 likely does not.
Next, we limit the number of suspects tested per day (NT ) to a maximum of 0.1% of the
population (i.e. 9000 cases). This percentage is considerably larger than the daily test numbers
carried out in any country during the early stages of the COVID-19 epidemic [16], in particular
when taking into account that in the model each suspect only requires a single test, whereas in
practice individuals had to be tested multiple times [16]. As shown in Fig. 2 (c) limiting testing
fundamentally changes the epidemic transition and causes a jump directly above the epidemic
threshold to 40% of the population infected. Comparing Fig. 2 (a) and (c), if 50% of the infectious
have weak symptoms, for limited tests 65% of the population become eventually infected whereas for
unlimited tests this value is only 35%. The abrupt jump in the epidemic transition has been verified
for various other settings, including the aforementioned alternative network implementations (see
Fig. 3) and different domain sizes (see Fig. 4). Even though the network connectivity slightly shifts
the epidemic transition point, in all cases it remains in the range of 35 to 50 percent weak-symptom
carriers and moreover all qualitative features are unaffected.
In the following we set the ratio of weak-symptom carriers to 45% (for COVID-19 some studies
suggest that asymptomatic cases alone already account for 40% to 50%). Even in this conservative
scenario the society is above the epidemic threshold and although slowed down by testing (NT =
10−3P ), the disease is not contained and will spread at an exponential rate. However, if in addition
social distancing measures are implemented, the spread can be stopped. In the model we assumed
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FIG. 3. Effect of the network structure on the transition for unlimited daily tests (NT = P , grey dots)
and limited daily tests (NT = 10
−3P , black dots). (a) Base model with population P = 3000 × 3000. (b)
Kleinberg Navigable Small World Network [8], as implemented in NetworkX 2.4 Python library [17], for
a population P = 500 × 500. (c) Base model with the addition of high-connectivity hubs for a population
P = 1000× 1000. In addition to the local neighbourhood, each individual is assigned a number of random
long-range connections sampled from a discrete power-law distribution with exponent 2 and cut-off threshold
of 100 connections. (d) Scale-free network (cf. [9]) for a population P = 1000 × 1000. Each individual
is assigned a number of random connections sampled from a discrete power-law distribution with exponent
2 and cut-off threshold of 100 connections, without a local neighbourhood. In (a) and (b) the domain is
initially seeded with 4·10−5P randomly scattered weak-symptom cases, whereas in (c) and (d) with 1·10−5P
randomly scattered weak-symptom cases.
that SD cuts the transmission probability by 15% (the exact value is not important). Interestingly
and as shown in Fig. 5 (a) and (b), SD must be implemented early and if introduced after a cut
off day containment breaks down and the fraction of the population finally infected directly jumps
to 40%. This discontinuity, just as the one in Fig. 2 (b), is a direct consequence of limited suspect
testing.
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FIG. 4. Effect of the domain size on the transition for unlimited daily tests (NT = P , gray dots) and limited
daily tests (NT = 10
−3P , black dots). The population for figures (a), (b), (c) and (d) is P = 200 × 200,
P = 500× 500, P = 1000× 1000 and P = 3000× 3000, respectively. In all four cases the domain is initially
seeded with 4 · 10−5P randomly scattered weak-symptom cases.
To further illustrate the consequences of limited testing we consider three countries each with
the same population size of 1 million and initially identical outbreaks. In all cases the disease starts
to spread on day 0 and the outbreak is eventually detected on day 15. From day 15 all symptomatic
cases are immediately quarantined, and they and their neighbours are tested with an upper limit
of 1000 tests per day. After the identical start the countries’ responses differ. The first country
(blue in Fig. 5 (c)) reacts early and implements social distancing rules (e.g. masks compulsory in
public places) on day 22. The other two countries only realize one week later that testing on its
own is insufficient and at this point they implement the exact same SD rules as country one did
seven days earlier. However, in country two and three (orange and red curves in Fig. 5 (c)) the
number of infected continued to increase and the finite time horizon set by test limitations has
passed. Unlike in country one, in countries two and three the combined containment effort fails.
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FIG. 5. Combined effect of quarantine and social distancing. (a) Comparison between different containment
scenarios for pW = 0.45, with testing and quarantining (TQ) and social distancing (SDn) starting from day
n. When social distancing, the transmission rate is reduced by 15%. Social distancing measures alone (blue
and yellow curve) are mostly ineffective in comparison with combined quarantining and social distancing
enforced from day 17. However, a late start of the latter results in a drastically higher percentage of final
infected cases (pink curve). In all the TQ cases testing is limited to NT = 10
−3P . (b) For pW = 0.45 and
limited testing conditions (NT = 10
−3P ) the combined effect of quarantining and early social distancing
leads to a relatively low number of final infected cases if started early enough. A later start of SD results in
an increasingly higher ratio of NF /P up until a critical time is reached (tSD = 21) at which a discontinuous
jump of NF /P is observed. (c) Comparison between three different countries and their response under
limited testing. A disease initially spreads undetected until day 15 (gray line). At this point all three
countries implement contact tracing and quarantining of suspects. The first country implements SD early
on day 22 and successfully manages to contain the outbreak (blue line). On the other hand, the other two
countries wait implement SD one week later, however, their late action can not contain the disease spread
and lead to a surge in new cases (yellow and red line). At day 97, one country decides to ramp up testing
(additional 200 tests per day, red line), while the other resorts to a strict lock down (transmission probability
reduced by 60%, yellow line).
9Eventually, on day 97 country two and three impose additional measures. Country two increases
test numbers by 200 every day (i.e. 20% of the original capacity). Despite the significant amount
of new tests, the number of new daily cases continues to increase (red curve in Fig. 5 (c)). Country
three on the other hand imposes a lock down. For lock down we assume that transmission rates
decreases by 60%, the exact value is not important as long as it is sufficiently larger than the SD
value. Once the numbers have considerably decreased on day 117 the yellow country goes back to
the exact same SD measures and testing numbers that had failed on day 29. After the lock down
and with a smaller number of active cases in the population, now these measures are effective and
the number of daily cases decreases.
IV. DISCUSSION
The model suggestion that containment can be achieved if contact tracing is combined with
an early implementation of social distancing is in line with the examples of South Korea, Japan,
and Taiwan, where despite differences in contact tracing strategies (mobile phone data was used
in South Korea but not in Japan), the common denominator of these cases is a high acceptance
rate and immediate implementation of SD measures such as wearing masks. In contrast to many
European states, these countries did not have to resort to full scale lock downs.
The longer term benefit of a lock down has been debated recently and for overwhelmingly large
numbers of weak symptom carriers, lifting the lock down would indeed result in an immediate
second outbreak as suggested by [18]. If however the disease is only moderately above the epidemic
transition threshold (see estimates for COVID-19 parameters in Fig. 2 (b)), a lock down effectively
acts as a reset shifting time to a stage before contact tracing is overwhelmed (i.e. to the left of the
discontinuity in Fig. 5 (b)). Under such conditions, a subsequent combination of contact tracing
and social distancing can keep the situation under control. The persistently low infection numbers
in Hubei province as well as in countries like Austria and Germany where the lock down has been
lifted more recently, indicate that COVID-19 may fall into this latter parameter regime.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Although the parameters of COVID-19 such as transmission rates and the percentage and role
of weak-symptom carriers are still under debate, even for conservative estimates and with highly
efficient contact tracing, including complete removal of local clusters, immediate quarantining and
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unlimited testing in place, our models predict that containment fails. Nevertheless, testing is highly
effective in limiting the spread, but under realistic conditions it will quickly reach its capacity
limit. If additional social distancing measures are implemented before this happens the outbreak
is contained, however if the implementation is just marginally late the identical combination of
measures fails.
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